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Introduction
Recent growth in calls for, and examination of, the accountability of NGOs (see, for example, has arisen from the corporate, state and civil sectors. Such calls raise a number of intriguing issues about, inter alia, the nature of accountability, the rights of those who call for it as well as unresolved issues about the means for its discharge. More especially such calls direct our attention to largely unaccustomed articulations of the accountants' craft within a civil society context (see Lehman 1999 Lehman , 2001 Lehman , 2005 and the challenges this may raise for such matters as the elusive nature of the "accounting entity" and what constitutes appropriate reporting of performance. In a wider context this challenge to NGOs raises the spectre of the suppression of civil society in the name of neo-liberal agendas -a suppression which employs the very language and concepts with which civil society has sought to control neo-liberal organisation.
These are significant issues. Any discussion of NGOs is set against a backdrop of widening gaps between rich and poor, the growing size and power of companies (see, for example, Korten, 1995) and an increasing concern that poverty may be the ultimate threat to global stability, (see Simms, 2000, p2) . Equally it is set against a backdrop in which the very mechanisms that (in all probability) produced the global environmental degradation and the gap between rich and poor (namely the processes that have led to the explosion in production and consumption that allegedly generates current growth in economic wealth) are consistently trumpeted as the only possible means of establishing environmental sustainability and social justice. We hear calls for more roll-back of the state and greater freedom for the World Trade Organization (WTO) to act as the saviour of the world's people, (see, for example, Said and Desai, 2003) . This potent brew is often seen as nothing less than a battle for the meaning of democracy and the self-determination and vibrancy of civil society itself -a battle within which NGOs play a critical and growing role, (see, for example, Bendell, 2000c) .
What does -and should -accountability mean in such a context? For accountants, more used to seeing the world as comprising an array of defined organisations (principally companies) typically intersecting via markets (and with the state typically under-theorised), accountability is typically seen as a notion which is relatively straightforward -if highly contested. This implicit assumption that accountability is a basically straightforward concept is challenged by the introduction of the notion of "civil society" -especially so when the organisations of interest -NGOs -are elusive accounting entities which actually seem to defy definition. This, then, offers a very large canvas upon which to locate this paper and a daunting array of issues to which attention may need to be drawn. We will seek to examine the principal themes (as we see them) of the contested terrain of civil society and the parameters, functionings and essences of accountability within that terrain. In doing so, we inevitably adopt an exploratory stance as we seek to articulate and locate these largely unfamiliar notions within a more familiar literature of accounting, accountability and reporting within advanced international capitalism. The paper is, thus, unashamedly an exploratory essay intent on clearing ground as a basis for future research.
This brings us to the particular motivations of this paper.
Central to our understanding of the issues is the call for greater accountability for organisations to which the accounting literature has not much paid attention. The opportunity to focus such attention provides an ideal prompt to return to and re-examine the essence of accountability and, thereby, to perhaps contribute a little more to its understanding and the way in which the notion operates in both forand not-for-profit contexts. Thus we place accountability at the heart of our enquiry and thereby develop prior work in the field (see, for example, Bebbington et al, 1999; Collison, 2003; Gray 1983; Gray et al, 1996) . However, to address NGOs we need also to consider the notion of civil society -something which is not much addressed in the accounting literature, (other than, notably, in Lehman's work, 1999; 2005) . And, finally, this investigation provides an opportunity to raise new potential issues and challenges for the social accounting project.
As a consequence, this paper is organised into three main elements as follows. Following this introductory section, we will examine what is implied by the notion of civil society and how we might locate the NGO. We do this in two sections which, respectively, seek to: define civil society; and define and locate the NGO. The second major element of the paper is an exploration of the realpolitik which motivates and gives meaning to the calls for NGO accountability. This element is addressed in two sections which, respectively, explore the rise of the NGO and the accompanying calls for accountability; and examine power and vested interests in the context of the NGO sector and NGO activities. The third, major element of the paper examines accountability. We first explore what accountability means in the context of the NGO before considering the normative question of the extent to which NGOs should be accountable. From this we start to develop more detailed components of what an NGO accountability might look like with especial reference to issues of size, closeness and epistemic communities. In so doing, we tease out two concluding notes. First, if the neo-liberal sector were to apply to itself the same demands of accountability that it appears to request from the NGO sector, the world as we understand it would be a very different place. Second, whilst there is considerable overlap in the essential natures of for-profit and not-for-profit organisational accountability the essential components in each are legitimacy and power, where these are located and how they are bestowed.
Before moving into the body of the paper there is one major caveat that we must record. Although there is, within accounting, a considerable literature on accountability as it relates to many (if not most) principal organisational forms, there is remarkably little, as far as we have been able to identify, that deals directly with NGOs. Consequently, the backbone of this paper has been provided by literature from outside the accounting and finance area. Such excursions always involve the risk that one might miss key literature. Typically this concern is assuaged by the discovery in this (new) literature of: key themes; repeated motifs in the debates: and, in due course, recognition of key scholars in this (new to us) field. This experience has not occurred to the extent we might have expected in our present exploration of that literature with a more direct focus on NGOs and their accountability. Our principal sources of literature have been the international development literature and, to a lesser extent, other civil society and not-for-profit literature. This has not yielded anything of the coherence and inter-relatedness we would expect from a mature and diverse literature. Consequently, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that there is key, relevant literature that we have simply failed to identify and thereby integrate. If this is the case, then we apologise unreservedly beforehand [3] .
Defining Civil Society
"We understand 'global civil society' as the socio-sphere located between the family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the natural confines of national societies, polities and economies" (Anheier and Themudo, 2002, p193) "… it is important to remind ourselves that the role of civil society -and especially NGOs -is to fill in the spaces in a healthy democracy and not to substitute for government…" (Edwards, 2000, p15) Discussions of how we are to understand NGOs are inescapably linked to descriptions of civil society. Civil society, has been a shifting and contested concept since at least the time of Hobbes and Locke (Robertson, 1986) . Hegel saw civil society as "a social formation intermediate between the family and the state" (Mautner, 1999, p96) . Marx and Engels drew a distinction between civil society (the ensemble of socio-economic relations and the forces of production) and the state (the superstructural manifestation of class relations inside civil society) and saw understanding the development and structure of civil society as pivotal to any explanation of political events, legal changes and cultural development (Abercombie et al, 1984) . Gramsci, as perhaps currently the most widely recognised theorist of civil society, sees it as lying between "coercive relations of the state and the economic sphere of production" (Abercrombie et al, 1984, p38 . For more detail see also especially Bendell 2000b). Thus we have the first motif of this part of the paper, that civil society (of which NGOs are an element) is that which exists between other elements of our social world and hence, civil society is defined by what it is not [4] . Definition is, as a result, difficult and contingent on definitions/descriptions of the other elements of society from which civil society emerges. Changes in these other elements will, likewise, affect the size and character of civil society. This is not to deny that civil society has a causal and reflexive relationship with the other identified components: It is not a residual concept at heart but the convenience of a definition, based on "what is not" carries a risk that it may be so regarded. This part of the social world is also the cradle of human development. Anthropologists distinguish two types of social organisation: those based on hierarchy and power (agonic), and those based on cooperation (hedonic). As Wilkinson (2000) This evolutionary background has profound contemporary consequences: it is arguably a key factor in explaining why illness, mortality and violence are all positively correlated with societal inequality (Wilkinson, 2000) . It also gives a longitudinal perspective in which structures of state and market domination are seen as comparatively recent incursions into civil society. Chandhoke (2002, p.45 and see the Union of International Associations -hereafter UIA -2004, for more detail), in common with more contemporary descriptions of civil society, describes it as being "located somewhere between the state, the market, and the family. Here people come together in projects of all kinds to make their collective histories". Edwards (2000, p.7) , in a similar vein, describes civil society as "the arena in which people come together to advance the interests they hold in common, not for profit or political power [5] , but because they care enough about something to take collective action". These descriptions differ from earlier ones in that the market has been introduced more formally as a sector which is no longer considered part of civil society. For example, Edwards (2000, p.7) states that "civil society includes all associations and networks between the family and the state except firms". The sense of civil society being defined by what it is not, however, remains. (See Figure 1 ).
The types of organisations which one finds in civil society (i.e. civil society organisations, CSOs) are inevitably diverse in terms of their: degree of formality; size (in terms of membership); geographic scope of activities; rationale for formation/operation; and linkages to the market/state/family categories. To speak of a 'typical' civil society organisation, therefore, is meaningless [6] . Despite problems in defining civil society [7] , the term continues to be used (see Kaldor et al., 2003a , but see also Robertson, 1986, p.44) and civil society organisations continue to grow in size, vitality and importance, (see, for example, Anheier and Themudo, 2002) . The reasons for this growth are complex. The rise in CSOs appears to be a function of the increasing size of the state (which is supposed to represent civil society but increasingly alienates it), and a market economy grown so virtual, large and hyper real that it actively alienates us. Hence the growth of CSOs which relate to us and can represent us, (Bendell, 2002b, p17) . Now, to make mattes worse, the state is withdrawing from functions it should undertake and CSOs arise to fill the democratic vacuum. In particular, as the state has withdrawn from many areas of what could be described broadly as social support (both in the West and elsewhere) CSO activity has increased. Indeed, Chandhoke (2002, p.43) suggests that economic imperatives of the neo-liberal agenda: In a similar vein, Teegen et al., (2004, p.467) note that CSOs emerge when "market mechanisms ignore these [human] needs and governmental regimes are deemed too repressive, too weak, or too resource-strapped to serve them". Thus we might see the growth in the importance of CSOs as a direct but partly unanticipated consequence of neo-liberal imperialism (Korten, 1995) . Civil society has grown as the state has retreated from historical areas of activity and the market has colonised more and more of the lifeworld (Thielemann, 2000) . People have consequently, through their own devices, pushed back to create organisations which serve the needs of the polity (Bendell, 2002b, p.17) . One such organisational form which flourishes in -and emerges from -this dynamic is the non-governmental organisation -the NGO.
Defining and Locating the NGO
Just as with civil society the definition of NGO is contested. NGOs are variously described as autonomous, non-profit-making, self governing and campaigning organisations with a focus on the well-being of others [8] and "whose stated purpose is the promotion of environmental and/or social goals rather than the achievement or protection of economic power in the market place or political power through the electoral process" (Bendell, 2000a, p.16) . Teegen et al., (2004, p.466) , quoting the United Nations (2003) [9] , describe an If we are looking for a definitive characteristic to distinguish the NGO from other organisations, Edwards' choice of "registration" is probably not quite it. There are forms of registration that might apply to charities, grant-receiving bodies, community-based enterprises and so on. Not all of these are necessarily NGOs -and not all NGOs are necessarily registered in this manner. At the international level, however, registration with some part of the United Nations or with the UIA would appear to qualify one as an NGO -but even here issues arise. For example, about 60% of those bodies which were registered with the United Nations for the Johannesburg Earth Kaldor et al., (2003b) identify four "manifestations of global civil society" -or four forms and functions in which NGOs engage. These are: New public management: (civil society as sub-contractors to policy makers); Corporatisation: (civil society organisations partnering with companies); Social capital or self-organisation: (civil society building trust through networking); and Activism: (civil society monitoring and challenging power-holders). Self organisation/social capital and activism are the expected, perhaps even traditional roles of the NGO. However, it is the first two roles which, Kaldor et al, demonstrate, are growing and wherein lie the new pitfalls for these organs of civil society. That is, new public management has increasingly drawn in NGOs as "service providers and instruments of privatisation" (Kaldor et al., 2003b, p.8 (Kaldor et al., 2003b, p.8) .
Caught up in this kind of role, NGOs will inevitably develop a very close relationship with the state and, as an element of civil society may be difficult to distinguish from the state on occasions. Equally, other NGOs will have closer relations with markets. For example, under the description of 'corporatisation note that:
"[w]illingly or reluctantly, companies and NGOs team up to divide responsibilities the state is failing to meet. NGOs `professionalise': under pressure from management gurus they increasingly adopt corporate strategies, as well as being open to partnerships with business. ….[T]he corporatisation of NGOs will gather momentum, encouraged by a resource-poor international community eager to seek new forms of cooperation, particularly in development assistance and capacity building" (op cit. p.9).
Amongst the many dangers involved in this Kamat, (2003) for example, argues that NGOs become more like the bodies from which they attract funding than like the societies they intend to represent and from which they draw their legitimacy. Such issues all serve to blur the distinction between NGOs and non-NGOs.
Such blurring of boundaries is clearly relevant for the definition of NGOs and it directly affects both estimations of the size of the sector and the demands for accountability. Thus, if NGOs are to be defined by the fact that they are registered and serve the public interest (see especially Fries, 2003) then some way of establishing the latter is necessary. Of most importance in the present context is whether or not we might legitimately include business related organisations such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) as NGOs. The reason this is a matter of significance in that there is a growing suspicion (to which we will also return) that much of the call for NGO accountability has originated within the business sector itself and such calls, if they are to apply to Amnesty, Red Cross and Greenpeace must also then apply to ICC and WBCSD. The matter remains murky and thus whilst ICC is included in both the Johannesburg-registered "NGOs and other organisations" and in World Vision's analysis of NGO accountability (Kovach et al, 2003; and see below) , it is specifically excluded by b) . Equally, we struggle to see how the ICC and the WBCSD can be distinguished from members of the market, because these organisations are staffed and funded by, and represent market participants.
Estimates of the size of the NGO sector are, inevitably, difficult [15] . Kaldor et al., (2003a, b) and Glasius et al., (2002a, b) produce the data shown in Tables 1 and 2 [16] . The data reported in Table 1 reports the growth in numbers of international and internationally-orientated NGOs as adapted from the UIA Yearbook and the 'new data' basis drawn from Kaldor et al, (2003a, p350) . Of course, as we have already seen there is doubt about the comprehensive nature of the UIA Yearbook and there is a considerable (largely inestimable) number of nationally-orientated NGOs which do not qualify for inclusion in the above figures. Nevertheless, Table 1 provides a glimpse into the relative size of the NGO sector by purpose, and provides some indication of the total number of such organisations. The data in Table 2 compares international NGOs with not-for-profit sector full time equivalent employment and volunteering for 1995/96. Despite the age of the data and the selectivity (it is derived from a self-reporting survey) of the countries covered it illustrates starkly how small the NGO sector is:-here compared with the NFP sector as a whole. Thus, although the sector is clearly extensive (and very diverse) it is relatively tiny when compared other typical categories of organisational activity.
This is significant because any calls for NGO accountability which are premised (typically implicitly) on the size of the sector should, therefore, be treated with some scepticism. More crucially, as many of the calls for NGO accountability are emerging from the corporate sector, one could suppose that the NGO sector would be similar in size and influence to that set of organisations. The data presented here suggests that this is unlikely to be the case and, in the next section of the paper, we will seek to demonstrate this more clearly.
Difficulties in both definition of NGOs and estimates of the size of the sector seem inevitable. Indeed there is more than a hint of suggestion (see , for example,) that the inability to define NGOs is both inevitable and part of what makes NGOs what they are. As Edwards and Hulme (1995) suggest:
y their very nature, NGOs must live and work in situations of necessary ambiguity. Some of these ambiguities are the result of the characteristics of NGOs as a form of organisation -accountable to trustees in one country but working with communities in others; committed to fundamental reforms but funded by donors and supporters who (by and large) demand short-term results;….." (Edwards and Hulme, 1995c p224) .
It seems that we will be unable to ever uniquely define NGOs or to fully reconcile the contradictions that seem inevitable in their existence -and this, it seems, may actually be an essential element of their importance and their success. It may also be, however, part of the reason that they are seemingly so vulnerable to attacks on their legitimacy and their accountability. It is this to which we now turn. (Bendell, 2002b, p.29) .
The Rise of the NGO, Realpolitik and the Demands for Accountability
As we have seen, Kaldor et al, (2003a) amongst others, see the rise of NGOs as a function of the space left by the declining reach of the state coupled with a growth in globalisation and the emasculation of local political ability. This appears to be a constant theme in the literature. For example, argues that the phenomenal growth in NGOs, especially since the Cold War, has arisen for three principal reasons. First, Edwards sees a powerful combination of a move away from a belief that free trade and liberalisation is the only recipe for growth and poverty reduction together with a dawning awareness that NGOs are no longer there just to pick up the pieces that fall through the cracks. Consequently, NGOs have become forces for alternatives and transformation themselves. Second, there has been a growing awareness that involving NGOs is a cost-effective public relations activity. This is especially so for organisations (most obviously the World Bank -see, for example, Zammit, 2003) that are under attack. Equally, NGOs are cost-effective in partnerships. This trend does, in turn, raise the problem that NGOs may be moving too close to the centres of power. Third, it is increasingly apparent that few people trust governments and that trust of business is in decline. NGOs offer additional -and more attractive -channels for popular participation and they can give a voice to the margins (what Edwards refers to as the move from 'government' to 'governance'). As Chandhoke puts it rather more directly:
"Ironically, the idea that people in civil society should organise their own reproduction has emerged at exactly the same moment as globalisation has drastically eroded the capacity of the same people to order their own affairs... NGOs emerged... to take over functions hitherto reserved for the state…. And NGOs were transformed into the guardians of civil society" (Chandhoke, op cit, p43) .
SustainAbility (2003), for example, also supports this perception and adds that factors such as: the growth in ex-communist and emerging nations embracing democracy and the hegemony of market based solutions; the communications revolution; and, more prosaically, continuing social inequality and environmental degradation have also contributed directly to the increase in size and importance of the NGOs sector.
Whatever the actual and/or precise causes of the rise of the NGO, it seems clear that they are one manifestation of fundamental and structural change in civil (and non-civil?) society [17] .
The NGO is, therefore, an increasingly important phenomenon and its rise is both a reflection of profound changes within human experience and a source of that change. The NGO partnerships with the United Nations, corporations and the World Bank are increasingly central to both the functioning of those institutions and to the delivery of 'non-market' benefits to the peoples of the so-called developing world [18] . The involvement of NGOs in the WTO (Zarsky, 2002) is helping the Southern nations to mobilise and organise themselves in readiness for future rounds of the WTO (Ritchie and Dawkins, 2002) and in developing new "scenarios of sustainable trade" (Najam and Robins, 2002) . The importance of NGOs in the current transformation of, or as a counter to the market's transformation of, society cannot be over-estimated. In essence, only the NGOs now offer any active alternative to total market-driven private sector domination of societies.
And yet, it is essential to retain a clear view of the relative powers involved here: "global civil society… can operate only within the narrow confines set by dominant states and international capital; it can amend international structures but not transform them" (Glasius and Kaldor 2002, p.9) . So, however much we may emphasise the crucial role of civil society in the maintenance of a sort of 'popular voice', people retain only such power as the State and the Market is willing to cede them: and that is restricted by the extent to which civil society is aware of its own interest and has not been seduced into a corporate lotus-eating bliss.
It is probably this combination of growing significance and crucially circumscribed power that leads NGOs into the treacherous terrain in which they find themselves walking a fine line between getting too close to funding bodies, the State and corporations (and thereby risking their independence, legitimacy and the trust of their grass roots support) whilst struggling to survive and maintain their integrity in the face of increasing (and increasingly subtle) attack from the vested interests that they challenge:
t is no accident that questions about legitimacy are being raised at a time when NGOs have started to gain real influence … They are victims of their own success. Neither is there a shortage of hypocrisy among the critics, especially when it appears that NGOs are being singled out in contrast to businesses (and even many governments) that are even less accountable than they are" (Edwards 2000, p.22/23) .
The situation is made even more complex not only by the diversity of NGOs (and, consequently an 'attack' on NGOs intended to curb Greenpeace is also attack on the Red Cross for example) but also because the catchall -"NGOs" -encompasses neo-liberal organisations (including business-led "astroturf" NGOs) which espouse a business agenda under the cover of NGO legitimacy. ICC and the WBCSD, for example, appear to be close to this line [19] Here the question of honesty and transparency looms large: campaigning NGOs (by and large) do not tend to hide their agendas while corporate bodies -under the guise of an NGO -can undertake extensive lobbying activities, beyond the public gaze. Any calls to account for NGOs must apply equally to those who are making the noisy demands for NGO accountability in the first place [20] .
It is in this complex state that the calls for NGO accountability are so effective and potentially disruptive. It is not, as we shall explore in the final substantive section of this paper, that we wish to argue against accountability per se. Rather it is that we need to be clear who is being called to account? -and by whom? And to do that requires some indication of the relative power and access to resources of those involved. This is explored in the next section.
Power, Interest and the NGO Sector
In this section we seek to provide a context to the calls for -and our discussion of -NGO accountability. We do this by examining two sources of data: NGO Watch (which we cast into relief via the work of Charles E. Lindblom) and a study on comparative accountability undertaken by One World Trust (Kovach et al, 2003) .
NGO Watch is an initiative of the American Enterprise Institute [21] (hereafter AEI). The AEI, "the principal neo-con thinktank" (Blumenthal,2004) , has been identified as leading recent attacks on the legitimacy and accountability of civil-society organisations (see, Naidoo, 2004) . Indeed, even SustainAbility (2004) has noted the political nature of these attacks and particularly those via the AEI's 'NGO Watch' initiative.
Criticising the political motivation of NGO Watch could be interpreted as a touch naïve given the realities of how powerful interests have long asserted themselves. Such realities have received examination by Lindblom who has long been a prescient observer, analyst and somewhat dispassionate critic of political economy (see, for example, Dahl and Lindblom, 1953; Lindblom, 1977; Lindblom 2001) . Lindblom (1977) , following Dahl and Lindblom (1953) , uses the term "polyarchy", rather than "democracy" to describe the pluralistic authority systems which obtain in most advanced economies. He also notes that the "pluralism of these systems remains grossly inegalitarian" (Lindblom, 1977) . When discussing the participation of business in polyarchy, Lindblom dismisses its involvement in electoral politics as too familiar [22] to warrant his close examination. He merely summarises these activities as including the frequency and intimacy of contacts between politicians and officials; financing of political parties, and business propaganda and public relations.
What engages Lindblom's attention particularly is the level of resources which businessmen (sic) command and the discretion with which they may be utilised and he notes that "[n]o other group of citizens can compare with businessmen, even roughly, in effectiveness in the polyarchal process. How so? Because, unlike any other group of citizens, they can draw on the resources they command as public "officials" to support their activities in polyarchal politics" (Lindblom, 1977, p.194 ). This, he states, is a power not even shared by politicians: neither the US President nor other government officials, may utilise government funds for partisan purposes (notwithstanding the sometimes successful attempts to evade the constraints). "Not so with corporate executives" observes Lindblom, "[the] funds that pass through their hands in their official capacities -that is, the proceeds from corporate sales -can, with little constraint, be thrown into party, interest-group, and electoral activity in pursuit of whatever objectives the corporate executives themselves choose" (p.194) . This phenomenon and the ease with which these corporate assets can be used have, he states, "no rationale in democratic theory". In sum, Lindblom's thesis is clear: corporate bodies and those who speak on their behalf are not accountable for their actions in the arena of lobbying and influence with governments. Whereas NGOs (except those acting for business interests under the guise of being representatives of civil society) are overt about their agendas for social change, in many instances corporations have equally strong views which they express away from the public gaze.
NGO Watch is a case in point. Its self-proclaimed motives and aims are stated as follows:
"In an effort to bring clarity and accountability to the burgeoning world of NGOs, AEI and the Federalist Society have launched NGOWATCH.ORG. This site will, without prejudice, compile factual data about non-governmental organizations. It will include analysis of relevant issues, treaties, and international organizations where NGOs are active" (www.NGOWATCH.org, 2004).
NGOs may be seen as an attempt to redress the grossly inegalitarian pluralism of polyarchal society but, if so, the sponsors of NGO Watch are keen to emphasise the impropriety of any incipient muscle flexing. For example,
"NGO officials and their activities are widely cited in the media and relied upon in congressional testimony; corporations regularly consult with NGOs prior to major investments. Many groups have strayed beyond their original mandates and have assumed quasigovernmental roles. Increasingly, non-governmental organizations are not just accredited observers at international organizations, they are full-fledged decision-makers" (NGO Watch, 2004).
Lindblom has pointed out that the scale of corporate spending on what may be termed quasi governmental roles "dwarfs political spending by all other groups" and as a very crude heuristic we will attempt to contrast the scale of resources which are commanded by corporations with those available to NGOs. Clearly no obvious comparisons present themselves, given a host of problems of classification and data availability but since NGO Watch has chosen to display a list of what are presumably regarded as significant NGOs, we will focus on that listing to generate some figures in the first instance. Table 3 shows the top ten ranked by revenue [23] . We now give, by way of comparison, some of the annual revenues of corporations [24] beginning with those represented amongst the AEI trustees [25] (or, at least, those listed on the AEI website with the names of the trustees). Such figures are not, of course, to be taken to mean that NGOs do not owe a duty of accountability to their stakeholders. Rather, the numbers do put some perspective on the process whereby NGO accountability has become a focus of attention. To quote again from Lindblom, and bearing in mind that wealth distribution has become even more inequitable today than it was in the 1970s "[t]o compare political contributions from the personal incomes of ordinary citizens and allocations from business receipts is to compare mouse and mountain." However, it is obvious that the NGO mouse has been causing the corporate mountain more than a little irritation on such matters as GMOs (Bendell, 2000c) , the WTO (Simms, 2000) and, most especially, the World Bank (Fox and Brown, 1998; Zammit, 2003) .
NGO
The question is, at least in part, to what extent are business organisations justified in calling "foul" on the accountability playing field. For example, note that some believe that " [NGOs] have acquired the high moral ground of public opinion without being subject to the same public scrutiny given to corporations and governments" (quoting J.E.Garten, Dean of Yale School of Management, p7). This statement is in contrast to the thesis we have drawn out above. Nevertheless, business appears to be winning the propaganda war and succeeding in persuading the media and large swathes of the state and civil society that business is, indeed, accountable whilst NGOs are not. This seems an implausible claim on the face of it -not only because of different accountability channels and processes that we will explore in the final sections of this paper but because, despite the hue and cry, the much vaunted take up of social, environmental and, (especially) sustainability (sic) accountability by large corporations is woeful whilst the take up by smaller corporations is almost non-existent (see, for example, Kolk, 2003) . It is also a claim that Kovach et al., (2003) have put to the test.
At the heart of the Kovach et al., (2003) study [27] is an examination of the accountability processes of three groups of organisations:
transnational corporations (TNCs), NGOs and Intergovernmental organisations (IGOs). The accountability was proxied by two variables: member control and access to online information. The results are shown in Table 4 . Of course, one would need to extend considerable caution in relying on the results shown in Table 4 . The small sample and the use of two constructs as proxies for accountability both suggest that the results must be treated with great care. Nevertheless, the data is sufficiently strong to suggest that the sort of crude dichotomy -TNCs, accountable, good: NGOs, not accountable, bad -is seriously over-simple and would well deserve a more thorough investigation. Of more than passing interest is the place that the ICC (a business-based organisation and here included as an NGO) takes in the list of NGOs. Whilst the ICC does reasonably well amongst NGOs for the availability of on-line information it fares very badly on the dimension of member control and, indeed, on this survey is the "least accountable" of the NGOs. There is no apparent reason to believe that the results are contrived to this degree -although from a pro-NGO point of view the result is encouraging.
If this is the background and the generalities against which the debate about NGO accountability is set, what of the specifics? Are NGOs accountable? To what extent? and how? More demandingly, we also need to explore the more obviously normative questions of whether NGOs need to be more accountable and the form that such accountability should take. This is where we go in the final element of the paper.
In What Way and to What Extent are NGOs Accountable?
"civil society requires a careful balance between rights and responsibilities; between the entitlement of individuals to come together to pursue their own and the wider community's interests, and the right of society at large to have reasonable reassurance that such organisations are what they say they are, and in particular that they are not covertly abusing their position in ways that go beyond the legitimate exercise of individual freedom" (Fries, 2003 p.226) .
In general terms, NGOs are not-for-profit organisations (NFPOs) and, as such, enjoy structural relationships with (for want of a better word) their stakeholders and environment which are significantly dissimilar from those obtaining for commercial organisations. And, of course, it is from commercial organisations that the majority of the accounting literature typically draws its understandings of accountability. This has two major sets of implications.
First, NGOs are typically service organisations and those who control and fund the organisation (managers and donors) may well be quite distinct from the those who receive/benefit from the service (the client or beneficiary) [28] . There is, typically no direct means by which the clients/beneficiaries can enforce an accountability upon the donors and managers. If, in addition, (as is often the case) the NGO is not a membership based organisation, there is a clear absence of direct, obvious groups to whom the body must express its accountability. (See, especially, Uphoff, 1995; for more detail).
Second, NGOs, (as NFPOs), have no simple "bottom line" equivalent to the profit/loss measure of commercial organisations, (see, for example, Perrin, 1985; . There is thus, as Jegers and Lapsley (2001) " (p1) . The point being that (i) commercial organisations have an accepted bottom line in financial measurement; and (ii) that this financial measurement has tended to dominate all other forms of organisational performance measurement and accountability [29] . Thus commercial organisations are formally accountable for one dimension of their activity but, to varying degrees, unaccountable for the non-economic dimensions of their performance. NFPOs, including NGOs, have less financial accountability forced upon them and, more importantly, such financial accounting will be of little relevance in that the economic performance of such organisations is usually relatively unimportant -so long as they live within their means. Thus NFPOs do not have an obviously primary focus for formal accountability reporting -there is no analogue for financial profit/loss [30] . A considerable portion of the concern with innovative reporting and accountability systems for NFPOs has concentrated on finding analogues for the commercial "bottom line" -typically in the form of various performance indicators and such like [31] .
Consequently, it might be argued, (see, for example, Gray et al, 1987) , that social and environmental accountability in NFPOs might appear to be more under-developed than even in the commercial sector -not least because what might look a little like social or environmental accounting (e.g. client well-being, service delivered, complaints etc) is often no more than attempt to approximate an analogue for the primary reporting focus of commercial organisations [32] .
As we shall argue later, these issues do not necessarily influence the key principles on which accountability should be based. They do, however, affect the forms of accountability and what the accounts might look like.
However, to think of NGOs in general as being un-accountable would be incorrect. Whilst the channels of accountability may often not be formal or directly observable, accountability nevertheless takes place in many forms. First, and something often forgotten, is that many NGOs are also charities and whilst not all countries have detailed charity law laying down the terms of performance and accountability, most have some mechanisms that monitor and control the privilege of charitable status. Any general statement about the accountability (or otherwise) of NGOs must, in all probability, involve a general statement about the accountability of charities. Second, and perhaps most important of all, NGOs are subject to the public gaze, and, most particularly, to media scrutiny. As long as transparency exists ( a key matter we will emphasise below) informal means within civil society of holding to account exist and are engaged. Third, a key factor in the accountability of NGOs lies in the epistemic and engagement communities in which they are embedded. That is, whilst such arguments will not sway any neo-conservative attack on the sector, NGOs are actively accountable, through the shared values, understandings and knowledge, to the staff who work for them, to the other NGOs with whom they interact, to the communities in which they are embedded and to the professional knowledge base in which they operate and through which they share and cooperate [33] .
Fourth, as is clearly observable, many (most observably, larger) NGOs undertake formal systems of reporting and disclosure that are echoes of the corporate approaches to accountability. This last must not, however, blind us to Lehman's (1999 Lehman's ( , 2001 ) continuing concern over the emphasis (notably in the accounting literature) on procedural as opposed to substantial accountability. This is a particularly important concern for the NGO sector where, as we shall see, a procedural emphasis could stifle the very nature of the organisations and would be unlikely to reflect the diversity of the sector itself.
The Principles of Accountability
Accountability is, definitionally, about the rights of society (or groups/stakeholders within society) and relates to the rights that emerge from the relationship between the accountable organisation (the accountor) and the accountee. In this (as with so much else in the principles of accountability), NGOs are no different from other organisations and formal analysis of "stakeholders maps" and derivation of the different forms of information that need to be available for each relationship in the map would, as for any organisation, ensure completeness in the discharge of accountability, (see especially, Gray et al, 1997) [34] .
What a consideration of NGOs does raise however, is a number of matters which are inherent in accountability but which are rarely discussed in the accounting literature. These matters relate, principally, to issues of size and issues of formality.
It is often difficult (perhaps even impossible on occasions) to state with precision and clarity what uniquely measurable performance should dominate an NGO's accountability. However, this may, in fact, be relatively unimportant. As Jegers and Lapsley (2001) amongst others note, the relationships between NFPOs and their stakeholders -and especially their funders -is not a purely economic one (unlike that between shareholder and company). It is a more complex relationship and reflects more complex attitudes and interactions between the organisation and its stakeholders. Furthermore, the relationship may not be -nor need to be -as formal and as distant as that between a shareholder and company (the yardstick against which all accountability relationships appear to be judged). Matters such as trust, emotion, conscience, social contracts, mutuality etc all enter into the relationship and to reduce such complexity to single performance measures is to demean the complexity of the relationship. Therefore to adjudge an NGO as "accountable" or "not accountable" on the presence or absence of a predetermined singular measure of some performance or other is almost certainly mistaken.
At the same time, for many NGOs, regardless of size, accountability will naturally occur in some way: through a combination of personal contact and the visibility of the activities undertaken by the NGO. (That is, if one can, for example, drop into an NGO and ask it about its activities then a formal specific 'account' is not required). Formal accountability may well be an unnecessary burden -and an improper imposition -upon many NGOs (see, for example, Leat, 1988) . Indeed, even relatively slight formality of accountability mechanisms could emasculate small NGOs and manifest the concerns that Roberts and Scapens (1985) express (albeit in a different context) about accountability mechanisms reflecting power and, too often, accountability becoming a manifestation of inappropriately exercised power. So we may need to look for less obvious and informal systems of accounts if we are to properly understand NGO accountability and its discharge. This does, however, raise an interesting un-answered question as to the point at which any organisation becomes large enough to require degrees of formal accountability mechanisms [35] .
Furthermore, there will be some stakeholders who do not require a formal accountability -or who believe that the accountability owed to them is discharged in other ways. Knowing that Greenpeace are out in the North Sea opposing dumping or that Oxfam is present in Sudan delivering humanitarian relief may very well be sufficient accountability in itself. The very actions are the accountability and, more importantly perhaps, it is the knowledge that one is providing funding to an organisation which is doing something one would wish to do but which one is unable to do that is sufficient in and of itself. In a somewhat crude sense, the act that the funder requires is that somebody is willing to take their money and promise to act for them. The act itself may be relatively unimportant [36] .
Much of this can be captured by the Rawls' (1972) notion of "closeness". All relationships, Rawls notes, involve degrees of "closeness" and it is only in the absence of this closeness that a formal accountability is required. The formality required by shareholders and a company reflects the simplicity -but purely economic nature -of that relationship. It is a relationship not only of simplicity but of distance -it typically (certainly in the case of quoted companies) has no closeness within it [37] . Equally, the relationship between a company and its stakeholders is one of distance and complexity -again there is typically a complete absence of the components of closeness [38] .
NGOs -certainly grass roots NGOs -are the very essence of closeness. Much like familial, friendship, neighbourly and other relationships within civil society, their very essence is one of complex, close interaction. Whilst such relationships will frequently involve a physical closeness, there may be value and/or epistemic closeness (as for example between the members of a church or of a college). Relationships may involve one of more elements of these different aspects of closeness. Further, as a general rule, the greater the closeness, the less need for formal systems of accountability -any more than two friends or family members would require formal
This, in turn, draws our attention to the way in which accountability can be discharged and the way in which those who might wish for such discharge may be satisfied. It will often be that the activity itself will be, in effect, the account of that action (see especially Ahrens, 1996) . We see local authority employees emptying our dustbins/trashcans, we see Greenpeace in their boats intimidating ships seeking to dump waste in the oceans, and our need for accountability is satisfied. To the extent that we wish for further evidence of accountability, there are usually further channels of accountability -ways in which we can contact the NFPO and/or gain further information about it. This, as Hedlund and Hamm (1978) so persuasively argue, discharges the accountability as the existence of the channel is typically more significant than what might be either in that channel or the way in which formal accounts are communicated through the channel.
So, in a simple -i.e. non political world -the principles of accountability can be relatively easily framed through transparency and the notion of rights to information within relationships as mediated by closeness. Accountability can be considered discharged if, indeed, the information can be obtained through an existing channel.
But the very call for NGO accountability arises not only from failures in the principles of accountability -though these are important -but through realpolitik within which the NGOs have to operate. In the final substantive section of the paper we briefly explore what this might mean for NGO accountability.
The Form of NGO Accountability?
Lists of criteria by which the accountability of NGOs might be achieved already exist, (for examples of these see, especially, Tandon, 1995; and Fries, 2003) . The key, to our mind, though, is seeking to understand what accountability for NGOs does mean -and should mean -as well as how NGOs came to this "fall from grace" (as Edwards, 2000, calls it) that so threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the NGO sector. What are the underlying pressures and conflicts that deserve closer research attention in order to find a way towards a more effective NGO accountability without emasculating the NGO; deferring to "Astroturf" posturing or failing to recognise the genuine failures in NGO accountability? Usefully, analyses this "fall from grace" and attributes it to: Problems of legitimacy (which he sub-divides into transparency, accountability and accuracy); Problems of disconnection (the tension between global-level protest versus grass-roots activity); and Problems of short-termism (which arise from a tendency to only focus on the "politics of protest"). This is a useful and persuasive analysis because it identifies intrinsic weakness in the more visible NGO activities which the neo-liberal agenda could -and does -successfully exploit.
But to require all NGOs to collectively and individually address completely such a range of issues would effectively hobble the sectorand thereby achieve the neo-liberal agenda. We have already seen that complete systems of procedural, formal and visible accountability will, in many cases be both counter-productive and unnecessary. And so to guide us towards a more efficient and sensible approach to accountability, SustainAbility (2003) identifies -albeit pragmatically and inductively -what they call "drivers for accountability". They see accountability as driven by: Morality (accountability is right in principle); Performance (accountability improves effectiveness); Political Space (accountability increases credibility and thus influence); and Wider democratisation (accountability of NGOs improves democracy in society). And this helps, we believe, to keep us focused on the geo-political context within which any accountability relationship exists (and the influence which that must have on both the relationship between organisation and stakeholder and the means of its discharge). Furthermore, SustainAbility's "drivers" also appeal to the self-confidence of the NGO community to resist the exploitation (via these calls for accountability) of its essential self-doubt and self-reflection The key to this must be, as SustainAbility (2003) so eloquently demonstrate, transparency. Who the organisation is; what it does; how it is funded; and what the organisation does with the money it receives are all essential as either pre-requisites for the development of accountability relationships or a critical element in the discharge of that relationship. This, it seems, could be a first pre-requisite for accountability: and especially for NGOs as this would help to expose the 'astroturf' NGOs as well as developing a more benign accountability amongst those NGOs with a genuine concern for the wider public good.
So, given a basic requirement for transparency, what would an accountable NGO look like? For many, it might look a great deal like it does now. But, generally speaking, it will depend on the form of the NGO, its particular circumstances -including most particularly, its closeness and its exposure to political pressure. For example, Anheier and Themudo (2002) usefully differentiate between membership-based [41] and supporter-based organisations [42] . Apparently the trend is away from membership (even inactive membership) towards supporter-based NGOs (see also Fries, 2003) and, although this need not result in weaker accountability, it is just more likely to do so without the constant awareness within the organisation of an outside presence requiring answers or accounts.
So, given our reading, it seems to us that the issues are little different than those which arise with any form of multiple, social accounting for organisations, whether profit-seeking or not, (see, for example, Leat, 1988) . And such a suggestion is not new; Fowler (1995) recommended the use of multi-stakeholder social accounting for NGOs almost ten years ago and a range of 'values-based' organisations [43] have been developing the state of the art of social accounting that offers an array of means through which to develop and discharge accountability relationships (see, for example, Pearce, 1993 Pearce, , 1996 Pearce, , 2003 .
Conclusions
We have explored the growing phenomenon of the NGO in the light of growing calls -notably from the corporate sector -for increased accountability of these increasingly important organisations. Consideration of NGOs raises many (relatively unfamiliar) challenges for the accounting literature -most notably difficulty in defining the accounting entity and in placing the analysis within the less-explored arena of civil society. The novelty of the NGO and civil society within the accounting literature, the subtleties of the challenges for increased NGO accountability and the implication that such a consideration raises for our conceptions of accountability itself have determined the structure -and descriptive length -of the paper. The objective of the paper was to seek to act as a ground-clearing and state-of-theart exploration of the area, rather than to seek to produce conclusions as such.
However, the ultimate point is that an organisation can be accountable and still have its legitimacy questioned by either mischief makers or powerful vested interests. If the intention or the effect is to emasculate, muzzle or remove the independence (and hence the feisty disrespectfulness) of NGOs then it is a poor accountability and must be eschewed (see, for example, Eade, 1993; Kamat, 2003; Fries, 2003; Fox and Brown, 1998; Bendell, 2000c) . But the combination of minimum transparency plus a level of accountability commensurate with stakeholders, size and economic power, is likely, we would have thought, to discomfort the astroturf and the explicitly business-oriented NGOs (such as ICC and WBCSD) rather more than it will discomfort the high profile NGOs that the neo-liberal backlash has been seeking to discredit. As such, accountability seems like a good thing.
